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add to this critical literature, but to provide a potential explanation for some of the negative local experiences reported regarding peacebuilding interventions and to, at the minimum, provide a new perspective on the problem.
Using qualitative data regarding local experiences of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) collected during ten months of fieldwork in northern Sierra Leone, this paper describes the manner in which local people experience parallel peacebuilding processes -interventions applied simultaneously within the postwar setting -as interrelated, interacting, and sometimes confused. In the situation examined here local people re-imagined the goals and processes of the TRC in interaction with those of the various parallel peacebuilding processes, imagining connections and relationships between them and eventually undermining the coherence of the TRC in ways unpredicted by the international planners and administrators. What the data demonstrates is that international peacebuilding, and particularly complex peacebuilding efforts characterized by the parallel administration of multiple processes, is inherently generative of unexpected and potentially disruptive experiences among local people.
In response, I turn to the concept of 'friction' put forth by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing.3 F 4 While Rosalind Shaw has already exhibited how this concept can assist peacebuilding scholars and practitioners in understanding interactions between the international and local in Sierra Leone,4 F 5 I show how the concept can be expanded to understand 'compound frictions' wherein a diversity of international peacebuilding interventions -each embodying different and even competing "universal" norms and paradigms -interact with one another in the minds and imaginations of local audiences to produce unpredictable expectations and experiences. While Tsing's friction recognizes the interaction between international and local to be active and unpredictable, I argue there that 'compound friction' allows us to focus attention on the dynamic interaction on the ground between multiple parallel interventions within and among local actors. This paper, therefore, illustrates how the administration of parallel peacebuilding processes by the international community adds additional complexity to already "awkward engagements."5 F
6
The rest of this paper is divided into five parts. The first part briefly describes the civil war in Sierra Leone, the practices of the TRC, the goals it hoped to attain, and the 
War, Truth Telling, and Evaluation of Experience in Sierra Leone
For 11 years between the spring of 1991 and early 2002 Sierra Leone was the site of one of the most violent and confused conflicts in recent history. The war started with a small incursion from neighboring Liberia. However, as this small group, labeling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), attracted dissatisfied and disaffected portions of the population of Sierra Leone its numbers and strength quickly grew. Within just one year the RUF managed to accomplish its stated primary objective, the overthrow of the All People's Congress (APC) government, which had at that point been in power for some 24 years. However, instead of putting down their arms and joining the government in power, the new government and the RUF continued to fight, the conflict spiraled out of control, and violence became a common occurrence throughout the country for the next ten years.
Over this period a number of different armed groups committed various atrocities throughout the country. Children were regularly recruited and indoctrinated into many of them,6 F 7 women and girls were captured and taken as 'bush wives' and often subjected to rape and forced labor,7 F 8 and the amputation of hands, feet, arms and legs became a common event. 
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It was to explore the inconsistencies between transitional justice theory and these more locally grounded evaluations that I spent ten months in northern Sierra In these interviews I tried to determine what local people had understood about the TRC process, how they had been sensitized to it and how much they had been engaged by the project. I tried to determine how they had experienced the process of the hearings, if it had been a good thing or a bad thing, and how their family, friends, and community had reacted to the hearings process. For those who had not attended, I
tried to determine why they had chosen not to and if they felt they had missed an opportunity by not attending. Throughout, I avoided using terms such as reconciliation, healing, or justice, instead asking if the TRC had done what people expected or needed it to do, or if it had helped them to recover from the war. From these interviews a detailed picture of local experiences of the TRC emerged, but it was not what scholars of transitional justice or reconciliation predict.
Local Expectations, Experiences, and Parallel Peacebuilding Processes
If you talk only to the local educated English speaking elites in Makeni, or as one local man described them, those who 'hold the town,' you might come to believe that both the goals and processes of the TRC were clearly communicated to the local audience. As would or could do for them. As a result, local's overall experience of the process were heavily affected by the operation of these parallel peacebuilding processes.
In Sierra Leone there was a large radio campaign that was supposed to inform the population about the goals and processes of the TRC. Indeed, almost everyone with whom I talked said that they had heard programs on the radio that mentioned the TRC, and from this radio campaign some sensitization was achieved. The general idea of reconciliation between people seems to have been understood and even appreciated.
Brima, a 25 year old farmer, told me that they had 'brought the TRC because we were having war in our country, so that they will bring those that were in the bush and we the civilians to talk to us, so that we have peace with them.' Lansana, 30 years old, said that the 'the reason why they decided to come with the TRC is to make people forgive and forget.' Similarly Yamboi, a 30 year old salesman, said that 'the TRC means peace … during that time they were trying to bring people together, they were trying to explain the message for all that has happened. Let us forgive and forget.'
Each of these quotes describes, broadly, the actual mission of the TRC, and in this way we can see the partial success of the radio sensitization campaign. However, providing this quite cursory understanding of the goals of the TRC -peace, bringing people together, forgiving and forgetting -does not really provide any understanding of the process of the TRC, and it was the process that was confused with various other peacebuilding interventions. Yeabu was a 30 year old food seller, a woman who had left Makeni when she was younger but had returned during the war. When Yeabu was asked what she had heard as the key message of the TRC's radio sensitization campaign she responded:
What they were saying is that, they said they had cut the hands of people and now they are not having any help, others have died, others are not able to help their children to go to school and not giving them half help. The people are suffering.
This she interpreted as the key message of the TRC's radio programs. Not anything about how the TRC would work or what it would do. The radio messages were
supposed to explain what locals should expect from the TRC, but these important points were not well communicated and the result, among many, was a great amount of confusion between the TRC and the various other post-war processes that were administered after the war. For example, as was reported also by Schabas and by Shaw, 20F 21 many non-elite locals confused the operations of the TRC with those of the SCSL.
Kumba, a 37 year old woman working as a trader, who had attended the TRC, had seen her cousin shot during the war in Lunsar, where, she told us, the rebels had also burned her Aunt's house. When asked what she had heard about the TRC on the radio she responded that the TRC had come 'to judge those that were involved in the war.' Similarly, Adama, a 29 year old woman also working as a trader, said that 'when they called on those that did bad things … they took them to court.' Even Abdul, a young police officer, argued that the TRC was 'to try those, that those that committed the greatest responsibility, for them to be brought to book, so that they can answer exactly.' This role, the trial of those bearing the 'greatest responsibility,' was the mandate of the SCSL, not the TRC. In this way, the messages non-elite locals understood from the sensitization campaign were confused and conflated with the messages being communicated regarding the SCSL, which operated parallel to the TRC.
Schabas considers this a potential success of the TRC's sensitization campaign, in that it proves, he says, that locals had knowledge of the existence of both bodies.2 1F
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But I would argue the opposite. I would say it shows that local non-elites confused the two processes. Horovitz suggests that when Truth Commissions and courts function side by side 'advance planning should include a comprehensive sensitization program prior to the creation of the mechanisms to educate the public on their respective roles'.2 2F 23 In an ideal world, this is how it would work. However, such confidence in sensitization campaigns in desperately poor countries among largely illiterate populations is naïve. When these two parallel peacebuilding processes interacted with the local communities they produced not clear impressions of their respective mandates, goals and procedures, but misunderstanding and a conflation of purposes.
The two streams of information were intertwined and re-imagined by local people;
absorbed into an unpredicted conception of both the TRC and the SCSL; one that the planners of both had failed to expect and which produced among local people unpredictable expectations. However, it was not only these two transitional justice institutions that were confused among the population.
Other local people confused the work carried out by the TRC with that of The radio sensitization campaign appears to have been rather successful at informing people that the TRC was coming, or that it would assist in bringing peace. However, it The TRC, what they put in front was they were to give the former combatants packages, and they said after that they are going to consider us, the victims. Our consideration is still to come forth, since we don't hold guns and our business looks to be delayed. Most of our brothers have died. So but now some of us that are still living we don't know if we will have the opportunity for that because even me sitting here I am not well.
Similarly, Michael, the leader of one of two Polio victims groups in Makeni, felt that the TRC was a 'provocation,' because there was 'no packet for people that I see them, some of them who talk, there was supposed to be a reparation packet, up to now they are waiting for it. Like the amputees at Panlap, this is a crime.
In each of these quotes, we see the speaker, an educated English speaking local elite, describe the situation of the non-elites, the local-locals as Richmond has called them,2 4F 25 as expecting something and as feeling aggrieved at having not received it.
These speakers highlight that the expectations for the TRC among local non-elites were set by the processes of the DDR program, which provided the perpetrators of the violence with resources. As the TRC stated in its sensitization campaign that it was coming to help the victims and to bring peace, this was interpreted or re-imagined, in the local context, that this would be the same form of help that had already been given to the perpetrators; packets including money, skills training, and tools to start a new job.
The international community had given packets to those who 'had done the bad', so because it failed to do the same for victims it was seen, as one young woman named
Friction and International Intervention
As was noted in the introduction, a great amount of recent literature has been wrestling with the divergence between theory, practice, and experience in the field of peacebuilding. As in the case of Sierra Leone, the theorized results of peacebuilding projects do not always emerge when interventions are applied in local settings. Instead, complexities abound at the sites where the international and the local interact.
Intervention is rarely predictable. In response to similar dynamics in a different field, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing introduced the concept of 'friction' as a means to understand the dynamic processes of "global interconnection."2 5F 26 This concept allows us to study the movement of universalizing ideas from place to place in interaction with individual agents in particular local contexts who re-imagine and re-interpret them, and, in so doing, make them something new in their activation within that unique setting. In this way, Tsing argues that local "cultures are continually co-produced" through the "awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference."2 6F
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A central analogy for Tsing is that of a tire on a road, wherein it is the interaction of the two that produces movement and change. Without the friction between the two there would be no progress. However, at the same time, as universalizing ideas travel this generative friction is a source of heat, of tension, of debate, and of conflict. A paradigm or idea in one place may produce freedom, liberty, or justice for individuals or groups, but once it is seen as a universal and is transported to another setting it may have unexpected consequences. Tsing argues that this is because "concepts are transformed in translation"2 7F 28 and the imposition of a paradigm in a new setting can produce unpredictable results.
One way that this happens, she argues, is through "travelling packages;" concepts or universalizing ideas that "travel when they are translated in such a way as 
Conclusion
One of the greatest challenges for peacebuilding scholars and practitioners today is to understand the interaction between the international and the local. This is paramount if Third, more peacebuilding scholars must conduct qualitative studies of local understandings of peacebuilding processes -specifically among local non-elites -prior to, during, and after they are administered. Future research must explore further the compound frictions within complex peacebuilding contexts and study more fully both how parallel peacebuilding processes are conflated in local settings and how, or even if, this can be avoided. Comparative case studies across countries will be important in any future research agenda. And finally, scholars of transitional justice, security sector reform, reconciliation, democratization, memory, economic restructuring, psychological trauma, and the many other fields involved today in peacebuilding interventions, must cooperate more regularly to understand how their proposed processes affect locals on the ground. Future research into compound frictions in peacebuilding contexts requires cooperation across the disciplines studying the interventions that embody the many 'universalizing ideas' of peacebuilding.
